[{"id":23,"id_source":530204,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"edited_volume","type_order":5,"title":"Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence 2024 co-located with the 23rd International Conference of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence (AIxIA 2024), Bozen, Italy, November 28, 2024","year":2024,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Taticchi, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Taticchi, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"This volume contains the papers presented at the 8th Workshop on Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence (AI3 2024), held in Bolzano, Italy, on November 28th 2024. AI3 2024 was the 8th edition of the Workshop on Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence series, a venue that provides opportunities for stakeholders from academia and industry to present their recent work in argumentation theory. The goal of the workshop is to stimulate discussions and promote scientific collaboration among researchers in computational argumentation and related fields, including nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming, linguistics, natural language processing, philosophy and psychology, just to mention a few. The workshop was co-located with the 23rd International Conference of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence, the yearly AI conference of researchers, students, and industry professionals dealing with various aspects of AI in Italy. AIxIA 2024 took place in Bolzano, from 25 to 29 November 2024. AI3 2024 was held in presence. We received 10 submissions out of which 5 papers were accepted as regular papers, and 4 as short papers and\/or extended abstracts of project presentation. AI3 2024 offered an interesting and diverse program, which in addition to the technical papers, included an invited talk by Marco Guerini (FBK, Trento) on \u201cNLP for CounterSpeech-Trends and Open Challenges\u201d. Weare very grateful to the Program Committee for their invaluable efforts in providing helpful and informative reviews for all submissions in a timely fashion. Finally, special thanks go to Gianvincenzo Alfano (University of Calabria) and Stefano Ferilli (University of Bari) for their support during the organisation of the event, and to the General and Local Chairs of AIxIA 2024, for their engagement in the local organisation and constant support during the co-location","keywords":["Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence"],"pages":"","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/530204","volume":"3871","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-01-24 02:26:04","last_updated_oai":"2025-01-24 02:26:04","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":54,"id_source":530552,"institutes":["ICAR","IIT","ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"Empowering Public Interest Communication with Argumentation-Project Overview (Extended Abstract)","year":2024,"authors":["Baroni, P.","Bistarelli, S.","Fazzinga, B.","Fellin, G.","Flesca, S.","Furfaro, F.","Giacomin, M.","Parisi, F.","Proietti, C.","Russo, I.","Santini, F.","Taticchi, C.","Vernillo, P."],"authors_source":"Baroni, Pietro; Bistarelli, Stefano; Fazzinga, Bettina; Fellin, Giulio; Flesca, Sergio; Furfaro, Filippo; Giacomin, Massimiliano; Parisi, Francesco; Proietti, Carlo; Russo, Irene; Santini, Francesco; Taticchi, Carlo; Vernillo, Paola","authors_cnr_name":["BISTARELLI, STEFANO","FAZZINGA, BETTINA","PROIETTI, CARLO","RUSSO, IRENE","SANTINI, FRANCESCO","VERNILLO, PAOLA"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp00460","rp08790","rp13275","rp02389","rp22207","rp26280"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"The EPICA (Empowering Public Interest Communication with Argumentation) project aims to improve Public Interest Communication (PIC) through the use of advanced Computational Argumentation (CA) techniques. The project\u2019s activities include exploring the potential of CA to address specific PIC needs, developing formal models for effective communication, and applying them to real case studies for validation. It also focuses on developing reasoning algorithms and innovative tools to support PIC strategies, enable the dissemination and practical application of the results, and improve institutional communication practices to address critical societal challenges","keywords":["Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence, public interest communication"],"pages":"1-3","url":"https:\/\/ceur-ws.org\/Vol-3871\/paper9.pdf","volume":"","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence 2024 co-located with the 23rd International Conference of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence (AIxIA 2024), Bozen, Italy, November 28, 2024","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"23rd International Conference of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence (AIxIA 2024), Bozen, Italy, November 28, 2024","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-06-15 00:37:36","last_updated_oai":"2025-06-15 00:37:36","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":92,"id_source":530191,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"A Vector-Based Extension of Value-Based Argumentation for Public Interest Communication","year":2024,"authors":["Baroni, P.","Fellin, G.","Giacomin, M.","Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Baroni, Pietro; Fellin, Giulio; Giacomin, Massimiliano; Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"In this paper, we propose a mathematical model to quantify and analyse the impact of public interest communication on target audiences. Building on Bench-Capon\u2019s value-based approach, our model introduces the concept of value vectors to represent a multi-dimensional spectrum of values influencing audience perception and response. By employing vectors, we aim to capture the nuanced interplay between diverse values and the effectiveness of communication strategies","keywords":["Abstract Argumentation, Public Interest Communication, Value-based Argumentation"],"pages":"1-13","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/530191","volume":"3871","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence 2024 co-located with the 23rd International Conference of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence (AIxIA 2024), Bozen, Italy, November 28, 2024","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"23rd International Conference of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence (AIxIA 2024), Bozen, Italy, November 28, 2024","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-02-05 22:58:20","last_updated_oai":"2025-02-05 22:58:20","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":53,"id_source":530562,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"misc","type_order":11,"title":"Enabling the Digital Democratic Revival: A Research Program for Digital Democracy","year":2024,"authors":["Grossi, D.","Hahn, U.","M\u00e4s, M.","Nitsche, A.","Behrens, J.","Boehmer, N.","Brill, M.","Endriss, U.","Grandi, U.","Haret, A.","Heitzig, J.","Janssens, N.","Jonker, C. M.","Keijzer, M. A.","Kistner, A.","Lackner, M.","Lieben, A.","Mikhaylovskaya, A.","Murukannaiah, P. K.","Proietti, C.","Revel, M.","Roum\u00e9as, \u00c9.","Shapiro, E.","Sreedurga, G.","Swierczek, B.","Talmon, N.","Turrini, P.","Terzopoulou, Z.","Van De Putte, F."],"authors_source":"Grossi, Davide; Hahn, Ulrike; M\u00e4s, Michael; Nitsche, Andreas; Behrens, Jan; Boehmer, Niclas; Brill, Markus; Endriss, Ulle; Grandi, Umberto; Haret, Adrian; Heitzig, Jobst; Janssens, Nicolien; Jonker, Catholijn M.; Keijzer, Marijn A.; Kistner, Axel; Lackner, Martin; Lieben, Alexandra; Mikhaylovskaya, Anna; Murukannaiah, Pradeep K.; Proietti, Carlo; Revel, Manon; Roum\u00e9as, \u00c9lise; Shapiro, Ehud; Sreedurga, Gogulapati; Swierczek, Bj\u00f6rn; Talmon, Nimrod; Turrini, Paolo; Terzopoulou, Zoi; Van De Putte, Frederik","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"This white paper outlines a long-term scientific vision for the development of digital-democracy technology. We contend that if digital democracy is tomeet the ambition of enabling a participatory renewal in our societies, then acomprehensive multi-methods research effort is required that could, over theyears, support its development in a democratically principled, empirically andcomputationally informed way. The paper is co-authored by an international andinterdisciplinary team of researchers and arose from the Lorentz CenterWorkshop on ``Algorithmic Technology for Democracy'' (Leiden, October 2022)","keywords":["Computer Science - Computers and Society"],"pages":"","url":"http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/2401.16863v1","volume":"","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-06-15 00:26:28","last_updated_oai":"2025-06-15 00:26:28","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":132,"id_source":433900,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"journal_article","type_order":1,"title":"The Role of Argument Strength and Informational Biases in Polarization and Bi-Polarization Effects","year":2023,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Chiarella, D."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Chiarella, Davide","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO","CHIARELLA, DAVIDE"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275","rp24665"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"This simulation research explores the informational causes of polarization and bi-polarization of opinions within groups. We define 'polarization' here as a uniform change of the opinion of the whole group in the same direction, whereas 'bi-polarization' indicates a split of two subgroups towards opposite directions. For our purposes, we have expanded the model of the Argument Communication Theory of Bi-polarization. This is an argument-based multi-agent model of opinion dynamics inspired by Persuasive Argument Theory. The original model accounts for polarization as an outcome of pure informational influence and reproduces bipolarization effects by postulating an additional mechanism of homophilous selection of communication partners. The expanded model adds two dimensions: i. e., argument strength and more sophisticated protocols of informational influence (argument communication and opinion update). Adding the first dimension, allows us to investigate whether and how the presence of stronger or weaker arguments in a discussion influences polarization and bi-polarization dynamics, as suggested by the original framework of Persuasive Arguments Theory. The second feature allows us to test whether other mechanisms related to confirmation bias and epistemic vigilance can act as a driving force of bi-polarization. For the first issue, our simulations showed that argument strength has a measurable effect. For the second, our results would indicate that, in absence of homophily, only very strong types of informational bias can lead to bi-polarization","keywords":["Argumentation","Argument Communication Theory","Polarization","Bi-Polarization","Epistemic Vigilance","Opinion dynamics"],"pages":"25","url":"https:\/\/www.jasss.org\/26\/2\/5.html","volume":"26 (2)","doi":"10.18564\/jasss.5062","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"JASSS","publisher":"","issn":"1460-7425","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-03-13 22:57:29","last_updated_oai":"2025-03-13 22:57:29","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":170,"id_source":519990,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"journal_article","type_order":1,"title":"Corrigendum to \u2019the Role of Argument Strength and Informational Biases in Polarization and Bi-Polarization Effects\u2019 (Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, (2023), 26, 2, 5, 10. 18564\/jasss. 5164)","year":2023,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Chiarella, D."],"authors_source":"Proietti, C.; Chiarella, D.","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO","CHIARELLA, DAVIDE"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275","rp24665"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"This corrigendum refers to\u2019The Role of Argument Strength and Informational Biases in Polarization and Bi-Polarization Effects\u2019, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 26 (2) 5, 2023","keywords":["Argument Communication Theory","Argumentation","Bi-Polarization","Epistemic Vigilance","Opinion Dynamics","Polarization"],"pages":"","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/519990","volume":"26 (3)","doi":"10.18564\/jasss.5164","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"JASSS","publisher":"","issn":"1460-7425","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-01-21 23:09:15","last_updated_oai":"2025-01-21 23:09:15","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":190,"id_source":467363,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"An Abstract Look at Awareness Models and Their Dynamics","year":2023,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Vel\u00e1zquez Quesada, F. R.","Yuste Ginel, A."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Vel\u00e1zquez-Quesada, Fernando R.; Yuste-Ginel, Antonio","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"This work builds upon a well-established research tradition on modal logics of awareness. One of its aims is to export tools and techniques to other areas within modal logic. To this end, we illustrate a number of significant bridges with abstract argumentation, justification logics, the epistemic logic of knowing-what and deontic logic, where basic notions and definitional concepts can be expressed in terms of the awareness operator combined with the box modality. Furthermore, these conceptual links point to interesting properties of awareness sets beyond those standardly assumed in awareness logics, i. e. positive and negative introspection. We show that the properties we list are characterised by corresponding canonical formulas, so as to obtain a series of off-the-shelf axiomatisations for them. As a second focus, we investigate the general dynamics of this framework by means of event models. Of specific interest in this context is to know under which conditions, given a model that satisfies some property, the update with an event model keeps it within the intended class. This is known as the closure problem in general dynamic epistemic logics. As a main contribution, we prove a number of closure theorems providing sufficient conditions for the preservation of our properties. Again, these results enable us to axiomatize our dynamic logics by means of reduction axioms","keywords":["Awareness Logics, Dynamic Epistemic Logics, Deontic Logics, Event Models"],"pages":"455-469","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/467363","volume":"379","doi":"10.4204\/EPTCS.379","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE","publisher":"Rineke Verbrugge","issn":"2075-2180","isbn":"","conference_name":"TARK 2023","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-01-24 02:13:48","last_updated_oai":"2025-01-24 02:13:48","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":182,"id_source":477062,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"On the instantiation of argument-incomplete argumentation frameworks","year":2023,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Yuste Ginel, A."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Yuste-Ginel, Antonio","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Argument-incomplete argumentation frameworks provide an intuitive way of representing uncertainty in argumentative contexts. It is however possible that, taking structured argumentation as a reference point, the general assumptions of these models present the same risks of hasty generalization attributed to some abstract argumentation models, as they do not have a structured counterpart. Here, we focus on a specific instantiation of argument-incomplete argumentation frameworks: rooting the uncertainty about arguments in the uncertainty about the application of ASPIC-inference rules. We show (Proposition 1) that the abovementioned risk is concrete. Therefore a more fine-grained representation of uncertainty at the abstract level is needed, which we provide with implicative argument-incomplete argumentation frameworks and prove to work (Theorem 1)","keywords":["abstract argumentation, Incompleteness, structured argumentation, uncertainty"],"pages":"1-7","url":"https:\/\/ceur-ws.org\/Vol-3546\/paper12.pdf","volume":"3546","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"7th Workshop on Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"7th Workshop on Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence (AI^3)","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-02-05 23:08:09","last_updated_oai":"2025-02-05 23:08:09","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":397,"id_source":395537,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"journal_article","type_order":1,"title":"Dynamic epistemic logics for abstract argumentation","year":2021,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Yuste Ginel, A."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Yuste-Ginel, Antonio","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"This paper introduces a multi-agent dynamic epistemic logic for abstract argumentation. Its main motivation is to build a general framework for modelling the dynamics of a debate, which entails reasoning about goals, beliefs, as well as policies of communication and information update by the participants. After locating our proposal and introducing the relevant tools from abstract argumentation, we proceed to build a three-tiered logical approach. At the first level, we use the language of propositional logic to encode states of a multi-agent debate. This language allows to specify which arguments any agent is aware of, as well as their subjective justification status. We then extend our language and semantics to that of epistemic logic, in order to model individuals' beliefs about the state of the debate, which includes uncertainty about the information available to others. As a third step, we introduce a framework of dynamic epistemic logic and its semantics, which is essentially based on so-called event models with factual change. We provide completeness results for a number of systems and show how existing formalisms for argumentation dynamics and unquantified uncertainty can be reduced to their semantics. The resulting framework allows reasoning about subtle epistemic and argumentative updates-such as the effects of different levels of trust in a source-and more in general about the epistemic dimensions of strategic communication","keywords":["Abstract argumentation","Dynamic epistemic logic","Awareness logics","Multi-agent argumentation frameworks","Persuasion","Strategic Argumentation"],"pages":"1-60","url":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s11229-021-03178-5#citeas","volume":"","doi":"10.1007\/s11229-021-03178-5","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"SYNTHESE","publisher":"","issn":"0039-7857","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-01-25 22:47:54","last_updated_oai":"2025-01-25 22:47:54","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":394,"id_source":441147,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"Measuring bi-polarization with argument graphs","year":2021,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Chiarella, D."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Chiarella, Davide","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO","CHIARELLA, DAVIDE"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275","rp24665"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Multi-agent models play a significant role in testing hypotheses about the unfolding of opinion dynamics in complex social networks. The model of the Argument Communication Theory of Bi-polarization (ACTB), developed by Maes and Flache (2013), shows that simple circulation of arguments among individuals in a group can determine strong differentiation of opinions (bi-polarization effects) even with a small degree of homophily. The ACTB model and similar ones have nevertheless one limitation: given a topic of discussion, only direct pro and con arguments for it are considered. This does not allow to account for the topology of a more complex debate, where arguments may also interact indirectly with the topic at stake. This gap can be filled by using Quantitative Bipolar Argument Frameworks (QBAF). More specifically, by applying measures of argument strength for QBAFs in order to calculate the agents' opinion. In the present paper we generalize the ACTB measure of opinion strength to acyclic bipolar graphs and compare it with other measures from the literature. We then present a revised version of the ACTB model, where the agents' knowledge bases are structured as subgraphs of an underlying global knowledge base (described as a QBAF). We first test that the predictions of the ACTB model are confirmed when the underlying QBAF contains only direct pro and con arguments for a topic. We then explore more complex topologies of debate with two additional batches of simulations. Our first results show that changing the topology, while keeping the same number of pro and con arguments, has no significant impact on bi-polarization dynamics","keywords":["bi-polarization","abstract argumentation","opinion dynamics","multi-agent modelling"],"pages":"13","url":"https:\/\/ceur-ws.org\/Vol-3086\/","volume":"","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence 2021","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"20th International Conference Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence-5th Workshop on Advances in Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-02-05 22:45:46","last_updated_oai":"2025-02-05 22:45:46","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":491,"id_source":405489,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"journal_article","type_order":1,"title":"Mereology and time travel","year":2020,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Smid, J."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Smid, Jeroen","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Core principles of mereology have been questioned by appealing to time travel scenarios. This paper questions the methodology of employing time travel scenarios to argue against mereology. We show some time travel scenarios are structurally equivalent to more standard ones not involving time travel; and that the three main theories about persistence through time (i. e., endurantism, perdurantism, and stage theory) can each solve both the time travel scenario as well as the structurally similar classical scenario. Time travel scenarios that are not similar to more standard arguments are instead problematic because they are open to different, incompatible interpretations. We conclude that compared to the classical arguments against mereological principles, time travel scenarios do not add anything new","keywords":["Mereology","Time travel","Methodology","Parthood","Multilocation"],"pages":"2245-2260","url":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s11098-019-01308-x#citeas","volume":"177 (8)","doi":"10.1007\/s11098-019-01308-x","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","publisher":"","issn":"0031-8116","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-03-08 06:54:05","last_updated_oai":"2025-02-21 15:34:43","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":489,"id_source":459221,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"Persuasive Argumentation and Epistemic Attitudes","year":2020,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Yusteginel, A."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Yusteginel, Antonio","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"This paper studies the relation between persuasive argumentation and the speaker's epistemic attitude. Dung-style abstract argumentation and dynamic epistemic logic provide the necessary tools to characterize the notion of persuasion. Within abstract argumentation, persuasive argumentation has been previously studied from a game-theoretic perspective. These approaches are blind to the fact that, in real-life situations, the epistemic attitude of the speaker determines which set of arguments will be disclosed by her in the context of a persuasive dialogue. This work is a first step to fill this gap. For this purpose we extend one of the logics of Schwarzentruber et al. with dynamic operators, designed to capture communicative phenomena. A complete axiomatization for the new logic via reduction axioms is provided. Within the new framework, a distinction between actual persuasion and persuasion from the speaker's perspective is made. Finally, we explore the relationship between the two notions","keywords":[],"pages":"","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/459221","volume":"","doi":"10.1007\/978-3-030-38808-9_7","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-02-11 23:13:36","last_updated_oai":"0000-00-00 00:00:00","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":493,"id_source":404079,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"Persuasive Argumentation and Epistemic Attitudes","year":2020,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Yusteginel, A."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Yusteginel, Antonio","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"This paper studies the relation between persuasive argumentation and the speaker's epistemic attitude. Dung-style abstract argumentation and dynamic epistemic logic provide the necessary tools to characterize the notion of persuasion. Within abstract argumentation, persuasive argumentation has been previously studied from a game-theoretic perspective. These approaches are blind to the fact that, in real-life situations, the epistemic attitude of the speaker determines which set of arguments will be disclosed by her in the context of a persuasive dialogue. This work is a first step to fill this gap. For this purpose we extend one of the logics of Schwarzentruber et al. with dynamic operators, designed to capture communicative phenomena. A complete axiomatization for the new logic via reduction axioms is provided. Within the new framework, a distinction between actual persuasion and persuasion from the speaker's perspective is made. Finally, we explore the relationship between the two notions","keywords":["Argumentation frameworks","dynamic epistemic logic","persuasion","argument labellings"],"pages":"104-123","url":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-030-38808-9_7","volume":"12005","doi":"10.1007\/978-3-030-38808-9_7","editors":["Barbosa, L. S.","Baltag, A."],"editors_source":"Lui\u0301s Soares Barbosa, Alexandru Baltag","published":"Dynamic Logic. New Trends and Applications Second International Workshop, DaLi\u0301 2019, Porto, Portugal, October 7-11, 2019, Proceedings","publisher":"Springer","issn":"","isbn":"978-3-030-38808-9","conference_name":"Second International Workshop, DaLi\u0301 2019","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-03-05 04:26:55","last_updated_oai":"2025-03-05 04:26:55","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":404,"id_source":411390,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"misc","type_order":11,"title":"The wisdom and madness of crowds: argumentation, information exchange and social interaction","year":2020,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Smets, S."],"authors_source":"Carlo Proietti;Sonja Smets","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"","keywords":["fromal argumentation","logic","social sciences"],"pages":"15-16","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/411390","volume":"14 (3)","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"1757-0522","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-05-28 15:58:43","last_updated_oai":"2024-05-28 15:58:43","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":506,"id_source":404035,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"book_chapter","type_order":4,"title":"TRL semantics and Burgess' formula","year":2019,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Ciuni, R."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Ciuni, Roberto","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"The problem of future contingents is one of the most ancient and debated puzzles in Western philosophy, and Supervaluationism is, today, one of the most prominent solutions to the problem. Recently, John MacFarlane has carried a well-known criticism to Supervaluationism (and all other standard approaches to future contingents) and put forward a new solution of the problem of future contingents, which is known as Double Time Reference Theory (DTRT). Here, we compare DTRT with Supervaluationist semantics, and we show that the success of MacFarlane's criticism crucially depends on the expressivity of the language adopted. Once a reasonable expressive power is granted, however, MacFarlane's criticism no longer applies","keywords":["temporal logic","Burgess formula"],"pages":"","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/404035","volume":"","doi":"","editors":["Blackburn, P.","Hasle, P.","Ohrstrom, P."],"editors_source":"Patrick Blackburn, Per Hasle, Peter Ohrstrom","published":"Logic and Philosophy of Time: Themes from Prior. Volume 2-Themes from Prior","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-06-12 01:35:49","last_updated_oai":"2025-06-12 01:35:49","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":515,"id_source":404086,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"book_chapter","type_order":4,"title":"Future contingents, Supervaluationism, and relative truth","year":2019,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Ciuni, R."],"authors_source":"Carlo Proietti;Roberto Ciuni","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"The problem of future contingents is one of the most ancient and debated puzzles in Western philosophy, and Supervaluationism is, today, one of the most prominent solutions to the problem. Recently, John MacFarlane has carried a well-known criticism to Supervaluationism and put forward a new solution of the problem of future contingents, which is known as Double Time Reference Theory. Here, we compare DTRT with Supervaluationist semantics, and we show that the success of MacFarlane's criticism crucially depends on the expressivity of the language adopted. Once a reasonable expressive power is granted, however, MacFarlane's criticism no longer applies","keywords":["Future contingents","supervaluationism","modal logic"],"pages":"69-88","url":"http:\/\/www.edizioniets.com\/scheda.asp?n=9788846755193","volume":"","doi":"","editors":["Bellotti, L.","Gili, L.","Moriconi, E.","Turbanti, G."],"editors_source":"Luca Bellotti , Luca Gili , Enrico Moriconi , Giacomo Turbanti","published":"THIRD PISA COLLOQUIUM IN LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY. Essays in Honour of Mauro Mariani and Carlo Marletti","publisher":"ETS (Pisa, ITA)","issn":"","isbn":"9788846755193","conference_name":"","conference_place":"Pisa","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-05-15 11:51:07","last_updated_oai":"2024-05-15 11:51:07","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":570,"id_source":404076,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks, Modal Logic and Semantic Paradoxes","year":2019,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Grossi, D.","Smets, S.","Velazquezquesada, F."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Grossi, Davide; Smets, Sonja; Velazquezquesada, Fernando","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (BAF) are a natural extension of Dung's Argumentation Frameworks (AF) where a relation of support between arguments is added to the standard attack relation. Despite their interest, BAF present several difficulties and their semantics are quite complex. This paper provides a definition of semantic concepts for BAF in terms of fixpoints of the functions of neutrality and defense, thus preserving most of the fundamental properties of Dung's AF. From this angle it becomes easy to show that propositional dynamic logic provides an adequate language to talk about BAF. Finally, we illustrate how this framework allows to encode the structure of the referential discourse involved in semantic paradoxes such as the Liar. It turns out that such paradoxes can be seen as BAF without a stable extension","keywords":["abstract argumentation","bipolar argumentation frameworks","modal logic","semantic paradoxes"],"pages":"214-229","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/404076","volume":"11813","doi":"","editors":["Blackburn, P.","Lorini, E.","Guo, M."],"editors_source":"Patrick Blackburn, Emiliano Lorini, Meiyun Guo","published":"Logic, Rationality, and Interaction-7th International Workshop, LORI 2019, Proceedings","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"9783662602911","conference_name":"7th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2019","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-06-23 13:17:34","last_updated_oai":"2024-06-23 13:17:34","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":679,"id_source":405491,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"journal_article","type_order":1,"title":"Social Norms and the Dominance of Low-Doers","year":2018,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Franco, A."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Franco, Antonio","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Social norms play a fundamental role in holding groups together. The rationale behind most of them is to coordinate individual actions into a beneficial societal outcome. However, there are cases where pro social behavior within a community seems, to the contrary, to cause inefficiencies and suboptimal collective outcomes. An explanation for this is that individuals in a society are of different types and their type determines the norm of fairness they adopt. Not all such norms are bound to be beneficial at the societal level. When individuals of different types meet a clash of norms can arise. This, in turn, can determine an advantage for the \"wrong\" type. We show this by a game-theoretic analysis in a very simple setting. To test this result-as well as its possible remedies-we also devise a specific simulation model. Our model is written in NETLOGO and is a first attempt to study our problem within an artificial environment that simulates the evolution of a society overtime","keywords":["Agent-Based Model","Social Norms","Game Theory"],"pages":"21","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/405491","volume":"21 (1)","doi":"10.18564\/jasss.3524","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"JASSS","publisher":"","issn":"1460-7425","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-06-14 00:41:32","last_updated_oai":"2025-06-14 00:41:32","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":595,"id_source":411323,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"book_chapter","type_order":4,"title":"Temps de la logique et temps de la physique","year":2018,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"L'histoire du raisonnement sur le temps est pleine de paradoxes et d'\u00e9nigmes, et la physique contemporaine ne fait pas exception. Les logiques en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, et plus en particulier les logiques temporelles, repr\u00e9sentent un outil formel rigoureux pour r\u00e9soudre ou clarifier des probl\u00e8mes de ce genre. Dans ce qui suit, nous allons d'abord expliquer, du point de vue de la logique philosophique, qu'est-ce que c'est un paradoxe et ce qui compte comme sa solution. Ensuite, nous allons illustrer la formalisation d'Arthur Norman Prior du paradoxe des futurs contingents. Ensuite, nous nous concentrerons sur deux paradoxes modernes-le paradoxe des jumeaux et le paradoxe du voyage dans le temps-et montrerons comment une logique temporelle ad\u00e9quate peut aider leur encadrement et leur compr\u00e9hension","keywords":["logique","relativite\u0301","paradoxes"],"pages":"149-168","url":"https:\/\/www.cnrseditions.fr\/catalogue\/philosophie-et-histoire-des-idees\/temps-de-la-nature-nature-du-temps\/","volume":"","doi":"","editors":["Huneman, C. B. E. P."],"editors_source":"Christophe Bouton et Philippe Huneman","published":"","publisher":"CNRS Editions (Paris, FRA)","issn":"","isbn":"9782271090836","conference_name":"","conference_place":"Paris","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-06-21 12:36:57","last_updated_oai":"2024-06-21 12:36:57","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":671,"id_source":411305,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"book_chapter","type_order":4,"title":"Bivalence and Future contingency","year":2018,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Sandu, G.","Rivenc, F."],"authors_source":"Carlo Proietti; Gabriel Sandu;Francois Rivenc","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"This work presents an overview of four different approaches to the problem of future contingency and determinism in temporal logics. All of them are bivalent, viz. they share the assumption that propositions concerning future contingent facts have a determinate truth-value (true or false). We introduce Ockhamism, Peirceanism, Actualism and T x W semantics, the four most relevant bivalent alternatives in this area, and compare them from the point of view of their expressiveness and their underlying metaphysics of time","keywords":["Future contingents","bivalence","temporal logic","Arthur Prior"],"pages":"333-350","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/411305","volume":"","doi":"","editors":["Hansson, S. O.","Hendricks, V."],"editors_source":"Sven Ove Hansson, Vincent Hendricks","published":"Introduction to Formal Philosophy","publisher":"Springer (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London, CHE)","issn":"","isbn":"978-3-319-77434-3","conference_name":"","conference_place":"Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-04-27 01:07:11","last_updated_oai":"2024-04-27 01:07:11","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":643,"id_source":404515,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"misc","type_order":11,"title":"\u00ab Paradoxe \u00bb, version acad\u00e9mique","year":2018,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"D\u00e8s l'\u00e2ge classique et pendant toutes les \u00e9poques suivantes la philosophie et la pens\u00e9e scientifique ont \u00e9t\u00e9 confront\u00e9es \u00e0 un grand nombre de paradoxes. Ceux-ci ont souvent jou\u00e9 le r\u00f4le de curiosit\u00e9s, ou bien de casse-t\u00eate et exercices de pens\u00e9e (comme les insolubilia de la scolastique m\u00e9di\u00e9vale). Toutefois, dans beaucoup de cas les paradoxes ont servi de v\u00e9ritable stimulus et moyen de r\u00e9vision des th\u00e9ories scientifiques. Dans cet article, nous allons d'abord pr\u00e9senter deux \u00e9tapes fondamentales de l'histoire des paradoxes, les paradoxes de Z\u00e9non et ceux de la th\u00e9orie des ensembles d'entre la fin du XIXe et le d\u00e9but du XXe si\u00e8cle. Les sections qui suivent se concentrent sur les dilemmes moraux, les paradoxes de la connaissance, et les paradoxes de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9. Le but est d'introduire le lecteur \u00e0 certains des probl\u00e8mes centraux dans les domaines de la philosophie morale, de l'\u00e9pist\u00e9mologie et de la philosophie th\u00e9or\u00e9tique. Cela est fait \u00e0 travers l'analyse structurelle de certains des paradoxes les plus d\u00e9battus dans ces domaines, l'exposition des approches majeures pour leur solution ainsi que de leur motivation th\u00e9orique","keywords":["Paradoxe"],"pages":"","url":"http:\/\/encyclo-philo.fr\/paradoxe-a\/","volume":"","doi":"","editors":["Kristanek, M."],"editors_source":"Maxime Kristanek","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-05-10 12:07:06","last_updated_oai":"2024-05-10 12:07:06","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":670,"id_source":404093,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"misc","type_order":11,"title":"\u00ab Paradoxe \u00bb, version Grand Public","year":2018,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Dans son usage courant, le mot paradoxe indique une opinion absurde, extravagante, ou en tout \u00e9tat de cause inacceptable par rapport \u00e0 ce qui est consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme connaissance commune. Cette acception est aussi manifeste dans son \u00e9tymologie grecque par\u00e1 d\u00f3xa, litt\u00e9ralement \u00ab opinion contre \u00bb. Toutefois, afin que l'on puisse proprement parler d'un paradoxe, une telle opinion doit \u00eatre support\u00e9e par un argument. On peut en fait d\u00e9finir un paradoxe comme un argument dont la conclusion est inacceptable tout en \u00e9tant d\u00e9riv\u00e9e \u00e0 partir de pr\u00e9misses en apparence acceptables, et au moyen d'un raisonnement apparemment correct (Sainsbury 2009). Dans une telle d\u00e9finition, certains termes sont plut\u00f4t vagues ou ambigus, comme par exemple \u00ab pr\u00e9misse acceptable \u00bb ou bien encore \u00ab raisonnement apparemment correct \u00bb. Une d\u00e9finition plus pr\u00e9cise risque cependant de contraindre de mani\u00e8re excessive l'usage du mot, ainsi que d'exclure bon nombre de propri\u00e9t\u00e9s caract\u00e9ristiques du concept. Il est utile ici de clarifier la notion de paradoxe par ses instances plus ou moins typiques, afin d'une part de mieux comprendre son extension, et d'autre part de montrer que caract\u00e9riser un argument comme paradoxal est chose relative","keywords":["Paradoxe"],"pages":"","url":"http:\/\/encyclo-philo.fr\/paradoxe-gp\/","volume":"","doi":"","editors":["Kristanek, M."],"editors_source":"Maxime Kristanek","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-06-14 13:05:00","last_updated_oai":"2024-06-14 13:05:00","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":788,"id_source":404008,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"book_chapter","type_order":4,"title":"Time of Logics, time of Physics","year":2017,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"The history of reasoning about time is disseminated with paradoxes and conundra and contemporary physics does not make an exception. Logics in general, and more in particular temporal logics, represent a rigorous formal tool in order to solve or clarify problems of this kind. In what follows we will first explain, from the point of view of philosophical logic, what is a paradox and what should count as a solution for it. After that we will illustrate A. N. Prior's formalization of the traditional paradox of future contingency and determinism. Then we will focus on two modern paradoxes-the twin paradox and the time travel paradox-and show how an adequate temporal logic can help their framing and understanding","keywords":["Time travel","relativity","paradoxes"],"pages":"39-53","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/404008","volume":"","doi":"10.1007\/978-3-319-53725-2","editors":["Bouton","Christophe","Huneman","Philippe"],"editors_source":"Bouton, Christophe, Huneman, Philippe","published":"Time of Nature and the Nature of Time","publisher":"Springer (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London, CHE)","issn":"","isbn":"978-3-319-53723-8","conference_name":"","conference_place":"Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-07-24 11:07:12","last_updated_oai":"2024-07-24 11:07:12","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":760,"id_source":411308,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"The Dynamics of Group Polarization","year":2017,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Exchange of arguments in a discussion often makes individuals more radical about their initial opinion. This phenomenon is known as Group-induced Attitude Polarization. A byproduct of it are bipolarization effects, where the distance between the attitudes of two groups of individuals increases after the discussion. This paper is a first attempt to analyse the building blocks of information exchange and information update that induce polarization. I use Argumentation Frameworks as a tool for encoding the information of agents in a debate relative to a given issue a. I then adapt a specific measure of the degree of acceptability of an opinion (Matt and Toni 2008). Changes in the degree of acceptability of a, prior and posterior to information exchange, serve here as an indicator of polarization. I finally show that the way agents transmit and update information has a decisive impact on polarization and bipolarization","keywords":["group polarization","argumentation frameworks","abstract argum"],"pages":"195-208","url":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/book\/10.1007\/978-3-662-55665-8","volume":"10445","doi":"10.1007\/978","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"Springer (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London, CHE)","issn":"","isbn":"9783662556658","conference_name":"Logic, Rationality and Interaction 2017 (LORI 2017)","conference_place":"Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-06-23 13:17:45","last_updated_oai":"2024-06-23 13:17:45","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":809,"id_source":411311,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"Polarization and Bipolar Probabilistic Argumentation Frameworks","year":2017,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Discussion among individuals about a given issue often induces polarization and bipolarization effects, i. e. individuals radicalize their initial opinion towards either the same or opposite directions. Experimental psychologists have put forward Persuasive Arguments Theory (PAT) as a clue for explaining polarization. PAT claims that adding novel and persuasive arguments pro or contra the debated issue is the major cause for polarization. Recent developments in abstract argumentation provide the tools for capturing these intuitions on a formal basis. Here Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (BAF) are employed as a tool for encoding the information of agents in a debate relative to a given issue a. A probabilistic extension of BAF allows to encode the likelihood of the opinions pro or contra a before and after information exchange. It is shown, by a straightforward example, how these measures provide the basis to capture the intuitions of PAT","keywords":["bipolar argumentation frameworks","group polarization"],"pages":"22-27","url":"http:\/\/ceur-ws.org\/","volume":"2012","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"CEUR-WS. org (Aachen, DEU)","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"AI*IA 2017","conference_place":"Aachen","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-06-23 13:17:30","last_updated_oai":"2024-06-23 13:17:30","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":878,"id_source":405492,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"journal_article","type_order":1,"title":"Reflecting on Social Influence in Networks","year":2016,"authors":["Christoff, Z.","Hansen, J. U.","Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Christoff, Zoe; Hansen, Jens Ulrik; Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"In many social contexts, social influence seems to be inescapable: the behavior of others influences us to modify ours, and vice-versa. However, social psychology is full of examples of phenomena where individuals experience a discrepancy between their public behavior and their private opinion. This raises two central questions. First, how does an individual reason about the behavior of others and their private opinions in situations of social influence? And second, what are the laws of the resulting information dynamics? In this paper, we address these questions by introducing a formal framework for representing reasoning about an individual's private opinions and public behavior under the dynamics of social influence in social networks. Moreover, we dig deeper into the involved information dynamics by modeling how individuals can learn about each other based on this reasoning. This compels us to introduce a new formal notion of reflective social influence. Finally, we initialize the work on proof theory and automated reasoning for our framework by introducing a sound and complete tableaux system for a fragment of our logic. Furthermore, this constitutes the first tableau system for the \"Facebook logic\" of J. Seligman, F. Liu, and P. Girard","keywords":["Social networks","Modal logic","Hybrid logic","Opinion dynamics","Social influence","Tableau systems"],"pages":"299-333","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/405492","volume":"25 (3-4)","doi":"10.1007\/s10849-016-9242-y","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"JOURNAL OF LOGIC, LANGUAGE, AND INFORMATION","publisher":"","issn":"0925-8531","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-01-24 23:18:21","last_updated_oai":"2025-01-24 23:18:21","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":949,"id_source":404027,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"book_chapter","type_order":4,"title":"Explicating Ignorance and Doubt: A Possible Worlds Approach","year":2016,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Olsson, E. J."],"authors_source":"Carlo Proietti;Erik J. Olsson","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"While the concepts of ignorance and doubt occupy central roles in epistemology as well as in philosophy generally, there have been surprisingly few attempts to give detailed analyses of these notions. We start out by identifying their main conceptual ingredients. We then propose a semi-formal account within the possible worlds framework of epistemic and doxastic logic. The upshot is that while ignorance can be construed as the absence of knowledge of any of the alternatives under scrutiny, doubt is a very special kind of ignorance. We develop two specific proposals for how to capture special features of doubt in our framework. One centers on the notion that doubt, as opposed to ignorance, requires maximum plausibility of opposing alternatives. The other is based on the assumption that, for an agent to doubt a proposition, she must entertain the question whether that proposition is true on her research agenda","keywords":["Doubt","Ignorance","Modal Logic"],"pages":"81-95","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/404027","volume":"","doi":"","editors":["Peels, R.","Blaauw, M."],"editors_source":"Peels, Rik ; Blaauw, Martijn","published":"The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"9780511820076","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-01-24 23:16:39","last_updated_oai":"2025-01-24 23:16:39","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":861,"id_source":405497,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"Understanding Group Polarization with Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks","year":2016,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO","PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275","rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Group polarization occurs when an initial attitude or belief of individuals becomes more radical after group discussion. Polarization often leads subgroups towards opposite directions. Since the 1960s this effect has been observed and repeatedly confirmed in lab experiments by social psychologists. Persuasive Arguments Theory (PAT) emerged as the most convincing explanation for this phenomenon. This paper is a first attempt to frame the PAT explanation more formally by means of Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (BAFs). In particular, I show that polarization may emerge in a BAF by simple and rational belief updates by participants","keywords":["Group Polarization","Persuasive Arguments Theory","Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks","Value-Based Argumentation Frameworks"],"pages":"41-52","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/405497","volume":"287","doi":"10.3233\/978-1-61499-686-6-41","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"COMMA 2016","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-03-09 11:13:06","last_updated_oai":"2025-03-09 11:13:06","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1226,"id_source":405480,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"journal_article","type_order":1,"title":"A DDL Approach to Pluralistic Ignorance and Collective Belief","year":2014,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Olsson, E. J."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Olsson, Erik J.","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"A group is in a state of pluralistic ignorance (PI) if, roughly speaking, every member of the group thinks that his or her belief or desire is different from the beliefs or desires of the other members of the group. PI has been invoked to explain many otherwise puzzling phenomena in social psychology. The main purpose of this article is to shed light on the nature of PI states-their structure, internal consistency and opacity-using the formal apparatus of Dynamic Doxastic Logic, and also to study the sense in which such states are \"fragile\", i. e. to identify plausible conditions under which a PI state cascades into a state of shared belief as the result of announcement","keywords":["Pluralistic ignorance","Informational cascades","Dynamic logic","Social epistemology"],"pages":"499-515","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/405480","volume":"43 (2-3)","doi":"10.1007\/s10992-013-9277-3","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC","publisher":"","issn":"0022-3611","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-03-05 05:28:32","last_updated_oai":"2025-03-05 05:28:32","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1202,"id_source":405498,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"editorial","type_order":6,"title":"Editors' introduction: social dynamics and collective rationality","year":2014,"authors":["Zenker, F.","Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Zenker, Frank; Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"","keywords":["Belief polarization","Belief merging","Debiasing","Doxastic disagreement","Dynamic epistemic logic","Echo chambers","Group topology","Informational cascades","Pluralistic ignorance","Truth approximation"],"pages":"2353-2358","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/405498","volume":"191 (11)","doi":"10.1007\/s11229-014-0430-5","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"0039-7857","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-06-12 01:33:41","last_updated_oai":"2025-06-12 01:33:41","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1089,"id_source":411318,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"misc","type_order":11,"title":"Arthur Prior","year":2014,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Ciuni, R."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Ciuni, Roberto","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Arthur Prior (1914-1969) si \u00e8 occupato di temi che spaziano dalla logica formale all'etica, ed ha fornito contributi di grandissima importanza soprattutto nell'ambito della logica modale, della metafisica, e della filosofia del tempo. E' considerato il padre della logica temporale e il precursore della contemporanea logica ibrida, \u00e8 stato un precursore della semantica a mondi possibili di Saul Kripke, e il sostenitore di una forma raffinata e davvero audace di attualismo, a sua volta fondata su una precisa concezione dei rapporti fra esistenza, fatti e verit\u00e0. Il suo approccio alla filosofia \u00e8 stato molto attento alle grandi questioni tradizionali di metafisica e ontologia, ma allo stesso tempo ha gettato le basi di nuovi ambiti d'investigazione in logica modale. Il presente profilo si propone di presentare e discutere alcuni fra i suoi contributi pi\u00f9 importanti e la loro rilevanza filosofica. In particolare, presenta e discute le semantiche per il branching time e la loro relazione con il problema del determinismo, le logiche ibride e la riduzione degli istanti a proposizioni, la logica Q e il problema della predicazione su individui contingentemente non esistenti","keywords":["Arthur Prior","Logic"],"pages":"499-515","url":"http:\/\/www.aphex.it\/public\/file\/Content20141031_APhEx10,2014ProfiliPriorCiuniProietti.pdf","volume":"10 (10)","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"2036-9972","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-04-13 11:05:56","last_updated_oai":"2024-04-13 11:05:56","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1342,"id_source":405499,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"journal_article","type_order":1,"title":"THE ABUNDANCE OF THE FUTURE A Paraconsistent Approach to Future Contingents","year":2013,"authors":["Ciuni, R.","Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Ciuni, Roberto; Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"Supervaluationism holds that the future is undetermined, and as a consequence of this, statements about the future may be neither true nor false. In the present paper, we explore the novel and quite different view that the future is abundant: statements about the future do not lack truth-value, but may instead be glutty, that is both true and false. We will show that (1) the logic resulting from this \"abundance of the future\" is a non-adjunctive paraconsistent formalism based on subvaluations, which has the virtue that all classical laws are valid in it, while no formula like phi boolean AND phi is satisfiable (though both phi and phi may be true in a model); (2) The peculiar behaviour of abundant logical consequence has an illuminating analogy in probability logic; (3) abundance preserves some important features of classical logic (not preserved in supervaluationism) when it comes to express those important retrogradations of truth which are presupposed by the argument de praesenti ad praeteritum","keywords":["Future contingents","supervaluationism","gluts","subvaluations","retrogradation of truth"],"pages":"21-43","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/405499","volume":"22 (1)","doi":"10.12775\/LLP.2013.002","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"LOGIC AND LOGICAL PHILOSOPHY","publisher":"","issn":"1425-3305","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-06-14 00:37:48","last_updated_oai":"2025-06-14 00:37:48","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1287,"id_source":405918,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"conference_article","type_order":7,"title":"Probabilistic Semantics for a Discussive Temporal Logic","year":2013,"authors":["Ciuni, R.","Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Ciuni, Roberto; Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"The paper introduces a probabilistic semantics for the paraconsistent temporal logic Ab presented by the authors in a previous work on future contingents. Probabilistic concepts help frame two possible interpretations of the logic in question-a 'subjective' and an 'objective' one-and explaining the rationale behind both of them. We also sketch a proof-method for Ab and address some considerations regarding the conceptual appeal of our proposal and its possible future developments","keywords":["probability","discussive logic","future contingents"],"pages":"1-13","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/405918","volume":"","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"978-1-84890-110-0","conference_name":"Logica 2012","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-03-01 07:49:28","last_updated_oai":"2025-03-01 07:49:28","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1474,"id_source":405484,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"journal_article","type_order":1,"title":"Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic, Kripke Models and Fitch's Paradox","year":2012,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO","PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275","rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"The present work is motivated by two questions. (1) What should an intuitionistic epistemic logic look like? (2) How should one interpret the knowledge operator in a Kripke-model for it? In what follows we outline an answer to (2) and give a model-theoretic definition of the operator K. This will shed some light also on (1), since it turns out that K, defined as we do, fulfills the properties of a necessity operator for a normal modal logic. The interest of our construction also lies in a better insight into the intuitionistic solution to Fitch's paradox, which is discussed in the third section. In particular we examine, in the light of our definition, DeVidi and Solomon's proposal of formulating the verification thesis as. We show, as our main result, that this definition excapes the paradox, though it is validated only under restrictive conditions on the models","keywords":["Intuitionistic logic","Epistemic logic","Fitch's paradox","Kripke models"],"pages":"877-900","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/405484","volume":"41 (5)","doi":"10.1007\/s10992-011-9207-1","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC","publisher":"","issn":"0022-3611","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-04-11 00:28:13","last_updated_oai":"2025-04-11 00:28:13","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1403,"id_source":411319,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"misc","type_order":11,"title":"Review of C. Gratton, Infinite regress arguments","year":2012,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"","keywords":["Infinite regress arguments"],"pages":"213-217","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/411319","volume":"4 (1)","doi":"","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"","publisher":"","issn":"0718-8285","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-04-28 10:38:54","last_updated_oai":"2024-04-28 10:38:54","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1693,"id_source":403986,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"journal_article","type_order":1,"title":"Fitch's paradox and ceteris paribus modalities","year":2010,"authors":["Proietti, C.","Sandu, G."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo; Sandu, Gabriel","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"The paper attempts to give a solution to the Fitch's paradox though the strategy of the reformulation of the paradox in temporal logic, and a notion of knowledge which is a kind of ceteris paribus modality. An analogous solution has been offered in a different context to solve the problem of metaphysical determinism","keywords":["Verificationism","Modal logic","Knowability","Epistemic logic","Epistemology"],"pages":"75-87","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/403986","volume":"173 (1)","doi":"10.1007\/s11229-009-9677-7","editors":[],"editors_source":"","published":"SYNTHESE","publisher":"","issn":"0039-7857","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2025-02-24 14:21:56","last_updated_oai":"2025-02-24 14:21:56","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1595,"id_source":404003,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"book_chapter","type_order":4,"title":"Carnap e il convenzionalismo semantico","year":2010,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Carlo Proietti","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"La Sintassi logica del linguaggio (Carnap, 1934) rappresentava tra altre cose, nelle intenzioni di Carnap, una spiegazione ed una giustificazione, alla luce degli allora recenti risultati di G\u00f6del, di un punto di vista convenzionalista riguardo ai fondamenti della matematica e del discorso scientifico in generale. L'immagine di convenzionalismo che ne risulta \u00e8 molto complessa e, per diversi aspetti, di difficile interpretazione. Una prima parte di questo lavoro sar\u00e0 dedicata all'elucidazione del problema dei fondamenti per come si presentava a Carnap al momento della stesura del suo lavoro, nonch\u00e9 all'analisi delle posizioni filosofiche che determinano il contenuto della Sintassi e, pi\u00f9 determinatamente, la scelta dell'opzione metalinguistica. Il metalinguaggio rappresenta infatti, nella visione di Carnap, il corretto metodo della filosofia della scienza e, pi\u00f9 in particolare, dell'analisi del problema dei fondamenti. Una seconda sezione sar\u00e0 dedicata ad enucleare i motivi per cui l'atteggiamento convenzionalista si adatta al punto di vista di un empirista, quale era Carnap, nello spiegare la nozione di analiticit\u00e0 o necessit\u00e0 logico-matematica. Le basi e le ragioni della spiegazione di tale concetto da parte di un logico neo-empirista sono chiaramente molto diverse da quelle che avrebbe fornito un empirista tradizionale. L'ultima sezione mette a confronto la posizione di Carnap, per come si \u00e8 venuta delineando, con la \"refutazione\", da parte di G\u00f6del, del punto di vista fondazionale espresso dalla Sintassi e del convenzionalismo in generale. La refutazione \u00e8 argomentata da G\u00f6del proprio sulla base del significato filosofico dei suoi due celebri risultati metamatematici, ed \u00e8 proprio sul terreno del metalinguaggio che si gioca il confronto possibile tra le motivazioni dei due","keywords":["Carnap","convenzionalismo"],"pages":"127-141","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/404003","volume":"","doi":"","editors":["Belotti, L.","Paoletti, G."],"editors_source":"Luca Belotti, Giovanni Paoletti","published":"Quaderni della Ricerca","publisher":"ETS (Pisa, ITA)","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"Pisa","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-06-25 16:28:59","last_updated_oai":"2024-06-25 16:28:59","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1635,"id_source":403999,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"book_chapter","type_order":4,"title":"The Kerry-Frege debate about object and concept: some remarks about Kerry's position","year":2010,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"The controversy between Kerry and Frege on object and concept went down in posterity after Frege's 1891 article \u00dcber Begriff und Gegenstand, even if Kerry's objections which sparked Frege's explanation are dated 1887 as they appeared in the IV article of his series \u00dcber Anschaung und ihre psychische Verarbeitung. In truth, a real debate between the two philosophers never took place because of Kerry's premature death in 1889. This meant that Kerry could not reply to Frege and above all he could not define the presuppositions of his own positions, thus leaving room for a number of possible exegetic suppositions which I will analyse in this paper","keywords":["Benno Kerry","object and concept","Frege"],"pages":"96-104","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/403999","volume":"","doi":"","editors":["Marletti, C."],"editors_source":"Carlo Marletti","published":"First Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology","publisher":"ETS (Pisa, ITA)","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"Pisa","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-04-27 00:51:26","last_updated_oai":"2024-04-27 00:51:26","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"},{"id":1796,"id_source":403992,"institutes":["ILC"],"type":"book_chapter","type_order":4,"title":"Ceteris paribus modalities and the future contingents problem","year":2009,"authors":["Proietti, C."],"authors_source":"Proietti, Carlo","authors_cnr_name":["PROIETTI, CARLO"],"authors_cnr_id":["rp13275"],"authors_cnr_institute":[],"abstract":"This paper presents two systems of temporal logic, \\Lambda_{CPT} and \\Lambda_{CPT@}, with ceteris paribus modalities. The principal aim is to show how this approach can be useful to give an ockhamist solution to the future contingents problem along the same lines of A. Prior. The interest of this work lies also in the fact that \\Lambda_{CPT@} represents an alternative modal account of supervaluationist and post-semantics approaches to temporal reasoning","keywords":["temporal logic","future contingents"],"pages":"304-325","url":"https:\/\/iris.cnr.it\/handle\/20.500.14243\/403992","volume":"","doi":"","editors":["Kuerzen, L.","Quesada, F. V."],"editors_source":"Lena Kuerzen and Fernando Velazquez Quesada","published":"Logics for Dynamics of Information and Preferences","publisher":"","issn":"","isbn":"","conference_name":"","conference_place":"","conference_date":"","last_updated_cnr":"2024-04-06 11:09:11","last_updated_oai":"2024-04-06 11:09:11","last_updated_www":"0000-00-00 00:00:00"}]